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Lazer: IOLA and Daubert

IOLA AND DAUBERT
HonorableLeon D. Lazer*
We have got two more cases; the end is near. We had some
problems, of course, in finding proper niches for some of the cases.
Other years had issues concerning the First Amendment,' Fourth
Amendment,2 Fifth Amendment,' Fourteenth Amendment,4 and the
cases were easy to classify. It is not so easy this year. Thus,
everybody drew a few cases that might not find a particular niche.
I have got two cases that I think are worthy of some interest and

some mention.
One is Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,' the result of

which looks like it may overthrow the entire IOLA trust account
scheme.6
The other is a case of some interest dealing with Daubert v.

Merrell Dow,7 which sets forth the standards for review of
scientific evidence in the federal courts.8

General Electric

* The Honorable Leon D. Lazer is a graduate of the City College of New
York, and received an LL.B from New York University Law School. Justice
Lazer served as an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division in the Second
Department from 1979 to 1986 and was a Justice of the Supreme Court from
1973 to 1986. He was a partner in the New York law firm of Shea & Gould;
Town Attorney for the Town of Huntington, New York; member of the
Temporary State Commission to Study Governmental Costs in Nassau and
Suffolk Counties, Chair of Pattern Jury Instructions Committee of the New York
State Association of Supreme Court Justices; author of many published judicial
opinions; member of the American Law Institute; member of the American and
New York State Bar Associations; and the Association of Supreme Court
Justices of New York State. Justice Lazer retired from the bench in 1986.
I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
6 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
7 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8The Supreme Court set forth a list of factors that can be used to determine the
evidentiary reliability of scientific expert testimony. These include whether the
theory or technique at issue can or has been tested, has been subject to peer
review and publication, has a known error rate, and is generally accepted in the
field. Id. at 593-95.
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Company v. Joiner9 is an extension of the continued debate over
the boundaries of the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert,
which overruled Frye v. The United States."0 The so-called Frye
rule states that expert testimony based on scientific techniques is
inadmissible unless the technique has gained "general acceptance"
within a relevant scientific community."
Frye, incidentally, involved the precursor to polygraph, or lie
detector, machines."2
Of great import to our audience, which consists largely of
municipal lawyers, is the fact that New York continues to follow
the Frye rule as far as scientific expert testimony is concerned.' 3
However, in the federal jurisdiction, it is now the Daubert rule 4
which controls.
Fifty years after Frye, the Federal Rules of Evidence came into
play. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 declares that "all relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution ...

by Act of Congress, by these rules or by other

rules prescribed by the Supreme Court ... '"'
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 further provides that "if scientific.
•. knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or determine a fact in issue.., an expert ... may testify thereto in

the form of an opinion."16
These rules seem to offer broader admissibility than the Frye
rule, which states that if the evidence offered is not generally
accepted by the scientific community, it is not admissible. 7 Rule
402 states, on the other hand, that all relevant evidence is
admissible."

And what is it that will make a particular contention more
believable or more reliable than another? What would make a
9 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
10 293 F. 1013 (1923).

"2 Id. at 1014.
' Id. at 1013-14.
13See People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1994).
14 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
15 FED. R. EVID. 402.
16 FED. R. EVID. 702.

17 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
18 See supra note

15 and accompanying text.
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certain result more likely to happen than another? The traditional
preponderance of the evidence rule. 9
In Daubert, the Supreme Court used the term "gatekeeper"2'
when discussing the role a judge plays in determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Within a short time, those in
practice began to contemplate the meaning of "gatekeeper." Of
course, every judge is a "gatekeeper" to the extent that the judge
makes rulings relative to the admissibility or exclusion of
But gradually, the "gatekeeper" rule has been
evidence.2'
expanded to the extent that a judge may hold pretrial hearings,'
which are tantamount to a "mini trial." This notion is furthered by
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner.
Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer states that a
judge may appoint experts to advise the judge.24 This is quite an
interesting development. I do not know to what extent that has
been done, but hearings, of course, are not unusual under the
Daubert rule. Therefore, whether Daubert in the end is more
restrictive than Frye is an issue that some argue.
What are the four standards of the Daubert rule? I have given
you the general language of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' but as
stated previously, the Daubert rule has four criteria for the
admission of scientific evidence.'
Has the theory that is being propounded by the experts been
tested, or can it be tested? Has it been subjected to peer review

'9 The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when evidence
demonstrates that the facts are "more probable than not." See In Re Wilson, 410
So.2d 1177, 1181 (La. App. 1982). See also BLACK'S LAw DICONARY 1064
(5th ed. 1979) (preponderance of the evidence: "that degree of proof which is
more probable than not.").
20 509 U.S. at 588. The Court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence assign
to the trial judge the "gatekeeping" responsibility to ensure that scientific
testimony is both relevant and reliable. Id.

21 id.

509 U.S. at 592-93.
23 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct 512, 520 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
24
Id.at 521 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text
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and publication? What is the known or potential rate of error?
-Andhas there been general acceptance?27
Note that the final criterion of general acceptance is the Frye
rule.28 Thus, Daubertindeed can be viewed as restrictive.
In Joiner, the plaintiff was an electrician who had labored for
quite a few years for General Electric, working with transformers. 9
There, he dipped his hands into PCB, which is a dangerous
substance regarded as a carcinogen; ultimately, he developed small
cell cancer." In addition, he was a smoker.3 There was a history
of lung cancer in his family.3" Moreover, he had dealt with two
other dangerous substances, called furans and dioxins, at his job.33
Plaintiff brought an action in the Georgia state court against
General Electric.34 The case was removed to the federal courts.3"
After depositions of the experts, General Electric moved for
summary judgment.36
Thus, before the district judge was a motion for summary
judgment based on the testimony of the experts during the
depositions. The district judge proceeded to analyze the testimony
of the plaintiffs experts as to whether PCB caused small cell
cancer.

37

The testimony of the plaintiffs experts was based on animal
studies and epidemiological studies of workers in various plants,
not only in the United States, but in other places in the world as
well.
The animal studies were not very good evidence, as they
amounted to the insertion of a large quantity of PCB's into mice,38
which eroded any real link to real life and to the conditions under
which Joiner had worked, or under which others had worked.
27

Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-95.
See supranote 11 and accompanying text
29
joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 515.

28

30 Id.
31 Id.
32

id.

33 id.
34

Id. at 514.

35 Id.

36

id.

37

38

id.

1

d. at 515.
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The epidemiological studies dealing with workers at other plants,
on the other hand, indicated a higher rate of cancer for those who
had worked with PCB's.39
Nevertheless, in all of these studies, no conclusion could be
reached that there was a link to the PCB's." The smallness of the
study, compounded by other deficiencies, made any link
attenuated, and thus the district court dismissed the case."'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed4" and stated something interesting,
which of course the Supreme Court dealt with on the appeal before
it.43 The Eleventh Circuit noted that when you are dealing with the
exclusion of evidence, rather than the admission of evidence, a
more stringent standard applies." Therefore, applying the more
stringent standard in this case, the district court should not have

dismissed.
There is another issue in the case as to whether these furans and
dioxins caused the cancer,45 but I do not wish to spend any time on
it.
There are a few lessons to be learned from Joiner. First, the case
comes before the Supreme Court, which reverses and rejects the
view that a different and more stringent standard applies to the
exclusion of evidence than applies to the admission of evidence.'
The second item of significance for us is that these epidemiological
studies to which I have referred, at least some of them, found a
higher incidence of small cell cancer occurring among those who
had worked with PCB. 47 Nevertheless, the conclusion of these
studies was that a link could not be made because of various
deficiencies in the studies."
One of the experts testifying for the plaintiff dealt with the
question, "how can you testify that there is a link when the studies
conclude there is no link?" In other words, "how can you separate
39 id.

40Id.
41Id. at 518.
42 id.

43Id.
44Id. at 516.
41Id. at 515.

4Id. at 517.
47Id. at 518.
48id.
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the methodology from the conclusion?" His response was that "if
a patient comes to me and says, 'am I in danger of getting cancer
from these PCB's, I, the expert, would look at the studies and,
regardless of the conclusion, tell the patient, 'yes, you are in
danger.'
The Supreme Court, however, says this is impermissible. 9 You
may not separate the methodology from the conclusion, which is a
primary lesson to be learned from the case.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals is reversed" and the case is
remanded for consideration of whether the cancer was caused by
furans and dioxins." The important lesson of the case, however, is
that you do not separate methodology from the conclusion; you do
not adopt a different standard for exclusion than for admissibility.
It remains, as the case states, that the standard for review of a
judicial evidentiary determination is abuse that,52 in either event,
the standard.
The New York courts never really talk about abuse of discretion
in evidence cases. I do not recall reading a case which discusses
abuse in this respect. We know, however, that evidentiary rulings
in New York are, as they are every other place, a matter of
discretion. 3
Someone who makes an incorrect ruling of significance has
obviously abused this discretion.
Therefore, the abuse of
discretion remains a standard, and there is no distinction between
admissibility and exclusion.
The final case I wish to discuss is of significance to everyone
who has to maintain escrow money. In New York, we are one of
the states that has the IOLA scheme, whereby you may pool

49

Id. at 519.

50 id.
51

52

id.
Id."We hold ...that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to

review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence." Id.
53 See, e.g., Riddle v. Memorial Hospital, 43 A.D.2d 750, 750, 349 N.Y.S.2d
855, 858 (3d Dep't 1973). In Riddle, the court states that the relevancy and
value of the demonstrative evidence in assisting the jury's understanding of the
case's pertinent issues usually must be preliminarily evaluated by the trial court
and, in this respect, admission or rejection of proffered evidence rests largely
within the discretion of the trial court. Id.
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escrow money in what is called an IOLA account.' IOLA stands
for "interest on a lawyer's account." The bank pays the interest to
an IOLA foundation, which then helps fund legal services for the
poor.55 The IOLA scheme is one which, I suppose, depending on
your point of view, is socially constructive.
The IOLA scheme is based on federal banking statutes,'
disciplinary rules,' and rulings from the IRS that the interest on
the escrow funds is not taxable. Therefore, all 48 of these schemes
have the same statutory and disciplinary base.58
Texas has essentially the same scheme that we do; they call it
IOLTA, "interest on lawyer's trust accounts." 9 In Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, a lawyer, holding his client's
retainer in an IOLTA account, brings an attack claiming the
IOLTA scheme was unconstitutional, as it amounted to a taking of
income interest under the Fifth Amendment. 6'
When you deposit money in an IOLA account, you are making a
determination that if you deposited the money in a separate
account, there would be no net interest. The cost of maintaining
the account, the tax consequences, and the shortness of time and
the like, would preclude the payment of interest on a NOW
checking account.
Ifyou arrive at this determination that is it; it is not reviewable by
anybody. But if you do not reach this determination, then
presumably you should not be depositing money in an IOLA
account.
When the case went before the district court,62" summary
judgment was granted to the defendant, Washington Legal
Foundation, on the basis that the plaintiffs had no property interest
in the interest. 63 That is, that they never would receive any interest,
54

See Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. 118 S. Ct 1925, 1928 (1998).
rd.
56
1d. at 1929.
55

57 id.
58 Id.
59 Id.

60 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
61

62

Id. at 1928-29.
Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation,

873
F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
63
Id.at 11.
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it would not have produced any interest, and that the whole scheme
was a governmental creation which produced interest that would
not otherwise have been produced had the money been placed in
separate interest-bearing accounts. Therefore, since this is not the
owner's interest, and the owner never would have received any
interest, it could not be a taking.'
The Fifth Circuit reversed65 and certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court, five to four.66
A truly ideological split was present in IOLA, involving, of
course, the bottom line problem. I think we can all be realistic
about it; the problem in this case is not interest, but rather the
funding of legal services for the poor.
The Court held that the old rule, that interest follows principle,
continues to be law.67 The petitioners argued, in the alternative,
that interest does not always follow principle; what about income
trusts; what about community marital situations and various others
under Texas law?68
The Court rejected these contentions.69 As to the "principle"
argument, the Court stated that only through the pooling of this
money in IOLA accounts would interest be produced at all.7"
Moreover, only through a governmental scheme is this interest
produced, so it does not really belong to the owner.'
The Court writes that whether the property has value or not is not
the criterion.72 Property is a series of rights; it is the right to use, it
is the right to possess, it is the right to dispose of.73 The fact that it
may not be worth anything does not make it any the less property.
Therefore, the contention that there would not be any interest
except for this IOLA scheme is rejected by the Supreme Court. 4
64

1d.

65

Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation,

at 7.

94 F.3d 996, 1004 (1996).
6 117 S. Ct. 2535 (1997).
67
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1931 (1998).
68
Id.
69 id.

70

Id. at 1932.

71 id.

72

Id. at 1933.

73 id.

74 Id.
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The dissent" is rather vigorous, in light of the ideological nature
of the case. Basically, the dissenters argue what I mentioned
before; that there would be no net interest except for the IOLA
scheme, and therefore this problem should not be approached in a
traditional interest follows property manner. 6
There is one other thing I want to mention about Phillips.
Obviously, the case is worth reading from the point of view of the
discussions of property, the interesting discussion of how IOLA
comes into being, and the confluence of these statutes and
disciplinary rules. But Justice Breyer, who joins in the dissent,7
writes "the question presented is whether interest earned on client
trust funds, which funds would not earn interest in the absence of a
special IOLTA program, amounts to a property interest of a client
'
I only
or lawyer for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment."Th
mention this to you, in one respect, because many of you have
written "The Questions Presented" in briefs and have struggled to
draft them properly. I have never seen - and of course that does
not mean that they do not exist - discussions of "The Questions
Presented." Thus, it is interesting that Justice Breyer looks at "The
Questions Presented," because during eight years at the Appellate
Division, in over eight thousand cases, I do not think I really ever
bothered to look at "The Questions Presented." They are loaded
questions written by the lawyers pointing in one direction or
another. With all the briefs you have to read, you cannot be
bothered reading a page, or two, of single-spaced type about "The
Questions Presented."
So I thought I would present to you the fact that Justice Breyer
does read "The Questions Presented."
And now at 3:30, which is the appointed time, we are able to
conclude. We appreciate your attendance, which was the best
attendance we have ever had.

75

Id.at 1934 (Souter, J., dissenting).

76

Id.at 1934, 1937 (Souter, J., dissenting).

1937 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77
7 8 Id. at

id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1999], Art. 8

1004

TOUROLAWREVIEW

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/8

[Vol 15

10

